COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA Present: Judges Willis, Fitzpatrick and Annunziata Argued at Alexandria, Virginia TRACY ANN CHURCH OPINION BY v. Record No. 0792-96-4 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA APRIL 8, 1997 MAURY CURTIS CHURCH FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY James H. Chamblin, Judge John D. Primeau (Stephens, Boatwright & Howard, on brief), for appellant. Kevin D. McCormick (Curtin, Nolan, Gallagher & Mroz, on brief), for appellee. Mother appeals from an order of the circuit court granting father's motion to dismiss her petition for child support. The court concluded that father owed no obligation of support because the court had previously terminated his parental rights with respect to the child. We find the court's order terminating father's parental rights is void for want of jurisdiction and, therefore, reverse the court's order dismissing mother's petition for child support. I. Maury Curtis Church (father) and Tracy Ann Church (mother) were divorced by final decree entered October 10, 1989. Independent of the parties' admissions, the court found that the parties' child "ha[d] been abandoned by his father; [and] that it [wa]s in the best interest of the . . . child to terminate [father's] residual parental rights." The court noted the parties had agreed that "it [wa]s in the best interest of their . . . child . . . to terminate the residual parental rights of the father." Thus, as part of the final decree, the court terminated father's residual parental rights, acting pursuant to former Code  16.1-279(A). The decree also eliminated father's obligation to provide child support and noted that mother "agreed to renounce any claim she may have for delinquent child support from [father]." In July 1995, mother filed a petition for child support. She acknowledged that the 1989 decree terminated father's obligation to support the child but argued that the child's best interests required a support order. Father filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the 1989 decree barred the relief wife sought and that the time for seeking relief from that decree had expired. The court granted father's motion, finding that it had jurisdiction to terminate father's parental rights pursuant to Code  16.1-241(A)(5) and 16.1-244. II. Mother failed to perfect a timely appeal from the October 1989 decree terminating father's residual parental rights. Therefore, to have that decree set aside, mother must establish that it is void. Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95, 353 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1987). A judgment entered by a court that does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter is void. Id. Although the parties agreed to the termination of father's parental rights, together with his support obligation, jurisdiction cannot be established by the parties' consent. Lucas v. Biller, 204 Va. 309, 313, 130 S.E.2d 582, 585 (1963). A court possesses only such jurisdictional powers as are directly, or indirectly, expressly or by implication, conferred on it by the constitution or legislation of the sovereignty on behalf of which it functions. 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts  58 (1995); see also Thacker v. Hubard, 122 Va. 379, 94 S.E. 929 (1918). Jurisdiction to terminate parental rights can be found neither in the common law nor in a court's inherent authority to proceed under its general equity powers. Willis v. Gamez, 20 Va. App. 75, 81-82, 455 S.E.2d 274, 277-78 (1995) ("`there was [no] legal authority under the common law . . . for a total relinquishment of parental rights and obligations or any inherent authority in any court to terminate them'") (quoting Carroll County Dept. of Social Servs. v. Edelmann, 577 A.2d 14, 25 (Md. App. 1990)). Accordingly, jurisdiction of the circuit courts to terminate parental rights must be found, if at all, within the statutory scheme. Id. at 81-83, 455 S.E.2d at 277-78. Under Virginia's statutory scheme, the circumstances providing authority for the termination of parental rights, and the attendant obligation of support, are limited. While Title 16.1 of the Virginia Code provides for the termination of parental rights, the reliance on it by the husband and the trial court is misplaced. Title 16.1, denominated, "Courts Not of Record," is manifestly limited to addressing only the power of the J&DR courts; Code  16.1-241, entitled, "Jurisdiction," cannot be relied upon to confer original jurisdiction on the circuit courts. The legislature's reference in Code  16.1-241(A)(5) to concurrent jurisdiction, upon which the circuit court relied in granting father's motion to dismiss, does not constitute a grant of jurisdiction to the chancery courts. It simply affirms that, where jurisdiction is granted to the circuit courts, the jurisdiction of the J&DR court is not exclusive. See Poole v. Poole, 210 Va. 442, 444, 171 S.E.2d 685, 686-87 (1970). Jurisdiction that does not exist, a fortiori, cannot be concurrent with another court's jurisdiction. In Virginia, the jurisdictional powers of the circuit courts are conferred by Code  17-123. That section grants to the circuit courts "original and general jurisdiction of all cases in chancery and civil cases at law" and "jurisdiction of all other matters . . . made cognizable therein by law." The circuit court's jurisdiction in matters relating to minor children is further "made cognizable" in three titles: Title 20, Title 63.1 and Title 31. We note, preliminarily, that Chapter 11 of Title 63.1, which confers chancery jurisdiction to circuit courts in adoption proceedings, necessarily implicates the termination of parental rights. See Code  63.1-233 ("The birth parents . . . shall, by . . . final order of adoption, be divested of all legal rights and obligations in respect to the child . . . ."); Doe v. Doe, 222 Va. 736, 746, 284 S.E.2d 799, 805 (1981); Cage v. Harrisonburg Dep't of Social Servs., 13 Va. App. 246, 249, 410 S.E.2d 405, 406 (1991). In the present case, however, the circuit court clearly did not proceed under the adoption statute. We also note that Chapter 2 of Title 31, which grants chancery jurisdiction to the circuit courts over guardianship, likewise does not confer jurisdiction to terminate parental rights; in any event, the court in the present case did not proceed under that section. See Code  31-4. Thus, of the three titles, only Title 20 could arguably be invoked here, as the trial court was proceeding in chancery on the matter of divorce, specifically adjudicating child custody and support. Chapter 6 of Title 20 confers chancery jurisdiction to the circuit courts over divorce, and over the custody, visitation and support of children, upon the court's exercise of its jurisdiction over divorce. Code  20-96, 20-107.2. However, under this title, there is no express grant of jurisdiction to the circuit court to terminate parental rights, and none can arise by implication. It is well established in Virginia that "jurisdiction in divorce suits is purely statutory, and it cannot be acquired by the courts inferentially or through indirection." Stroop v. Stroop, 10 Va. App. 611, 616, 394 S.E.2d 861, 864 (1990); see also Cutshaw v. Cutshaw, 220 Va. 638, 641, 261 S.E.2d 52, 54 (1979). Moreover, in addition to the jurisdictional infirmity in the case, the court's termination of parental rights was based, in part, on the parties' agreement to terminate father's obligation to pay child support. Indeed, the court refused to set the termination aside on the ground that mother had agreed to it. Such an agreement is void as against public policy and unenforceable as a matter of law under the principles of Kelley v. Kelley, 248 Va. 295, 298-99, 449 S.E.2d 55, 56-57 (1994), which we find applicable here. Cf. Orlandi v. Orlandi, 23 Va. App. 21, 27 n.3, 473 S.E.2d 716, 719 n.3 (1996). A decree based on such an agreement must likewise be deemed void. In sum, the court in this case lacked jurisdiction to terminate father's parental rights. Thus, the court's decree, terminating father's parental rights and concomitantly relieving him of his duty to support, is null and void. Accordingly, we reverse the court's decision granting father's motion to dismiss. Reversed. Willis, J., concurring. I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion. However, I would hold that the decree terminating the father's parental rights was void for failure to comply with the procedural and substantive requirements of Code  16.1-283. I would hold it unnecessary to address the potential jurisdiction of a circuit court to terminate parental rights in a properly postured and developed case.